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MODIFYING AMATEURISM: A PERFORMANCE-BASED 
SOLUTION TO COMPENSATING STUDENT–ATHLETES FOR 
LICENSING THEIR NAMES, IMAGES, AND LIKENESSES 
 




Amateurism is evolving and the NCAA is paying for it. With the 
NCAA’s focus set on preserving amateurism, it prohibited student–athlete 
compensation for any activity related to sports. However, college athletics 
are a lucrative business that generates its primary revenue from licensing 
Division I men’s basketball and FBS football players’ names, images, and 
likenesses. After years of criticism for its rules and regulations, the NCAA 
faced antitrust scrutiny from both former and current student–athletes. In 
2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the NCAA’s 
restrictions on student–athlete compensation violated the Sherman 
Antitrust Act. While the Court affirmed the decision to allow the NCAA to 
increase scholarships up to the full cost of attendance, it denied forcing the 
NCAA to allow student–athletes to receive cash payments. 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision created a dilemma for the NCAA. Since 
the NCAA may no longer restrict student–athletes from receiving 
compensation for the use of their names, images, and likenesses, it must 
determine how to compensate student–athletes while maintaining 
amateurism. Along with compensation, the NCAA faces issues with Title IX 
because the Court’s decision only allowed compensation for Division I 
men’s basketball and FBS football players. Further, when determining how 
to compensate student–athletes, the NCAA could face tax implications. 
Considering the O’Bannon decision along with the possible Title IX and 
tax consequences, the NCAA should incorporate performance-based 
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INTRODUCTION 
Picture the star basketball player on one of the University of 
California, Los Angeles’s historic teams.1 The team has just won the 1995 
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) national championship, 
and the athlete is a consensus All-American and has been voted the most 
outstanding player in the tournament.2 A couple months later, the athlete is 
selected ninth overall in the National Basketball Association (NBA) draft 
and is destined for stardom.3 Fast-forward nearly twenty years later: The 
fame and fortune has deteriorated, and the former star is now just a six-
foot-eight salesman at a Toyota dealership in Henderson, Nevada.4 After a 
long day at work, the former collegiate star decides to visit his friend.5 
While at his friend’s home, he comes across his friend’s child playing a 
college basketball video game that displayed a playable avatar of the 
former star’s younger self.6 The avatar depicted his same position, jersey 
number, uniform accessories, home state, height, weight, handedness, and 
skin color.7 The former athlete is perplexed that his likeness is being used 
without his approval or compensation.8 This is the life of Edward 
O’Bannon, who receives questions from fans every year during the NCAA 
tournament about how much he receives in royalties for his old games that 
are replayed on television.9 The answer is always the same: nothing.10 
In August 2014, the Northern California United States District Court 
decided O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, holding that the 
NCAA violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by restraining trade through 
 
 * Notes Editor, Michigan State Law Review; J.D. 2017, Michigan State University College of 
Law; B.S. 2012, Hampton University. The author would like to thank Marie Rauschenberger, Herman 
Hofman, and Professor Bruce W. Bean for their feedback, time, and guidance throughout the Note-
writing process, as well as the staff of the Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property for preparing 
this Note for publication. Further, the author would like to thank the MSU Legal Education Opportunity 
Program, the MSU Black Law Students Association, the Michigan State Law Review, and his family 
and friends for their support and encouragement. Last, but certainly not least, the author dedicates this 
Note to his parents, Glenda and William, for their unwavering love and support. 
 1. See Kurt Streeter, Former UCLA Star Ed O’Bannon Leads Suit Against NCAA Over Use of 
Images, L.A. TIMES (July 22, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/22/sports/sp-videogames-
lawsuit22. 
 2. See Steve Eder & Ben Strauss, Understanding Ed O’Bannon’s Suit Against the N.C.A.A., N.Y. 
TIMES (June 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/10/sports/ncaabasketball/understanding-ed-
obannons-suit-against-the-ncaa.html. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2015).  
 6. See id. 
 7. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2014).  
 8. See Eder & Strauss, supra note 2. 
 9. See Streeter, supra note 1. 
 10. See generally id. 
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price fixing in the relevant markets for collegiate athletics.11 The NCAA 
prohibited Division I men’s college basketball and Football Bowl 
Subdivision12 (FBS) football players from receiving any compensation for 
the use of their names, images, and likenesses in videogames, live-game 
telecasts, and other footage.13 This decision marked a major change in 
college sports, allowing Division I male college basketball and FBS 
football players to receive compensation for the use of their names, images, 
and likenesses in different media platforms.14 While some believe that this 
opinion does not protect the amateurism of college sports and shifts the 
focus away from education,15 others believe that it rightfully compensates 
exploited student–athletes.16 
However, in March 2015, the NCAA appealed the district court’s 
decision.17 While the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit largely 
affirmed the district court’s holding, it vacated the district court’s decision 
to allow students to receive cash payments separate from their educational 
expenses for the use of their names, images, and likenesses.18 This decision 
places a burden on the NCAA to determine a feasible solution to 
compensate student–athletes for the use of their names, images, and 
likenesses while maintaining its focus on amateurism and preservation of 
consumer demand.19 In addition to preserving amateurism and consumer 
 
 11. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1009. 
 12. See David Albright, NCAA Misses the Mark in Division I-AA Name Change, ESPN (Dec. 15, 
2006), http://www.espn.com/college-football/columns/story?id=2697774 (stating that the Football 
Bowl Subdivision was previously known as Division I-A football, which consists of the higher revenue-
generating programs “that offer a maximum of 85 scholarships and play most of their games on 
[television] in front of large crowds.”).  
 13. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1009. 
 14. Id. at 1005. 
 15. See James A. Johnson, It Is Not Time to Pay College Athletes, 25 NYSBA ENT., ARTS AND 
SPORTS L.J. 80, 80 (2014) (“The student–athlete’s mind-set and purpose could become distorted. The 
players could become more interested in making money than learning skills and information that will 
assist them after their playing days are over[.]”). 
 16. See Robert A. McCormick & Amy C. McCormick, A Trail of Tears: The Exploitation of the 
College Athlete, 11 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 639, 645 (2010) [hereinafter Trail of Tears] (“Although the 
NCAA asserts college sports are amateur and uses this argument to justify not paying its players, 
college sports have become a highly commercial enterprise.”). 
 17. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 18. See id. at 1079; Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Increases Value of Scholarships in Historic Vote, 
USA TODAY SPORTS (Jan. 17, 2015, 4:31 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/01/17/ncaa-convention-cost-of-attendance-student–
athletes-scholarships/21921073/ (stating that prior to the court of appeals decision, the NCAA’s 
representatives voted to increase the amount of expenses that are covered under athletic scholarships). 
 19. See Jon Solomon, Court Shuts Down Plan to Pay Athletes, Says NCAA Violated Antitrust Law, 
CBS SPORTS (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jon-
solomon/25322621/appeals-court-agrees-ncaa-violates-antitrust-law (“[T]he US Ninth Circuit Court of 
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demand, other potential problems, such as tax and Title IX20 implications, 
may arise because the O’Bannon decision only allows for the compensation 
of male college football and basketball athletes rather than all college 
athletes.21 
This Note proposes a solution to the amateurism with compensation 
problem, suggesting that the NCAA allow conferences, colleges, and 
universities to award student–athletes with performance-based scholarships 
for both academic and athletic achievements.22 This proposal allows (1) 
collegiate athletic programs to provide compensation to student–athletes in 
all sports based on the school’s revenue from the use of students’ names, 
images, and likenesses; (2) athletic departments to structure the amount of 
money that is awarded to student–athletes in a way that prevents possible 
tax implications and maintains the student–athletes’ amateur statuses;23 and 
(3) the NCAA to reopen the market for video game development to 
increase revenue and consumer demand.24 
Part I discusses the NCAA’s restrictions on student–athlete 
compensation, particularly its definition of “amateurism” and the scope of 
athletic scholarship coverage; further, it reviews antitrust law and examines 
the legal history of student–athletes’ attempts to receive compensation for 
the use of their names, images, and likenesses.25 Part II introduces the 
current state of student–athlete compensation with the O’Bannon trial and 
appellate decisions, including the correlation between amateurism and the 
relevant markets for licensing names, images, and likenesses.26 Part III 
briefly identifies the possible Title IX and tax complications that may arise 
 
Appeals upheld a lower court’s decision that NCAA rules restricting payment to college athletes violate 
antitrust laws, but also determined that a federal judge erroneously allowed players to be paid up to 
$5,000 per year in deferred compensation.”). 
 20. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2015). 
 21. See Erin E. Buzuvis, Athletic Compensation for Women Too? Title IX Implications of 
Northwestern and O’Bannon, 41 J. C. & U. L. 297, 298 (2015) (“The NCAA faces public criticism and 
legal action over its policies that prohibit compensation for college athletes, it has taken to using Title 
IX as a defensive shield.”).  
 22. See discussion infra Part IV (providing a solution that would allow the NCAA to preserve 
amateurism and compensate student–athletes for the use of their names, images, and likenesses). 
 23. See Kathryn Kisska-Schulze & Adam Epstein, “Show Me the Money!” – Analyzing the 
Potential State Tax Implications of Paying Student–Athletes, 14 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 13, 27 (2014). 
 24. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1067 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 25. See NCAA, 2015-16 GUIDE FOR THE COLLEGE-BOUND STUDENT–ATHLETE 20, 24 (2015), 
https://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/CBSA16.pdf [hereinafter NCAA 2015-16 
GUIDE]; In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 
2013); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 26. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 993-98 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
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because of O’Bannon.27 Part IV builds upon the analysis in O’Bannon to 
develop a formula for implementing student–athlete compensation, 
maintaining amateurism, and preventing Title IX and tax implications.28 
I. NCAA RESTRICTIONS ON STUDENT–ATHLETE COMPENSATION 
For over 100 years, the NCAA, as a self-governing entity, has 
regulated and influenced amateurism in college sports, specifically for its 
member schools.29 Since its inception, the NCAA has prohibited students 
from receiving compensation for their participation in collegiate athletics.30 
In the mid-1950s, the NCAA developed the term “student–athletes”31 in 
response to a Colorado State Supreme Court decision32 that an injured 
college football player is considered an employee and therefore entitled to 
workers’ compensation.33 The NCAA’s purpose was to change the public 
perception of college athletes, while preventing further litigation and 
mischaracterization of the athletes as employees.34 Shortly thereafter, the 
NCAA enacted rules allowing its member schools to award athletic 
scholarships to student–athletes.35 Although the NCAA has made several 
revisions to its rules over the years, the NCAA has consistently prohibited 
student–athletes from receiving any compensation outside of scholarships 
or grants for their athletic ability, including the revenue generated from the 
use of their names, images, and likenesses.36 The NCAA’s rules and 
 
 27. See Marc Edelman, The District Court Decision in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic 
Association: A Small Step Forward for College-Athletic Rights, and a Gateway for Far Grander 
Change, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2319, 2347 (2014). 
 28. See generally Michael A. Carrier & Christopher L. Sagers, O’Bannon v. National Collegiate 
Athletic Association: Why the Ninth Circuit Should Not Block the Floodgates of Change in College 
Athletics, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 299, 308 (2015). 
 29. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 973. 
 30. Id. at 973-74. 
 31. See NCAA, 2015-16 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 60, art. 12.02.13 (2015), 
https://www.ncaapublications.com/p-4388-2015-2016-ncaa-division-i-manual-august-version-
available-august-2015.aspx [hereinafter NCAA 2015-16 MANUAL] (defining “student–athlete” as “a 
student whose enrollment was solicited by a member of the athletics staff or other representative of 
athletics interests with a view toward the student’s ultimate participation in the intercollegiate athletics 
program. Any other student becomes a student–athlete only when the student reports for an 
intercollegiate squad that is under the jurisdiction of the athletics department, as specified in 
Constitution 3.2.4.5. A student is not deemed a student–athlete solely on the basis of prior high school 
athletics participation.”). 
 32. See Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423, 429-30 (Colo. 1953). 
 33. See Trail of Tears, supra note 16, at 664. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 974. 
 36. See id. at 974-76. 
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restrictions have been the subject of several lawsuits, the most prominent 
and recent being the antitrust scrutiny in the O’Bannon case.37 
A. NCAA Regulations and Antitrust Law 
The NCAA has strict rules regarding students competing in athletics.38 
In order to compete in NCAA Division I or II athletics, one must be 
certified as an amateur student–athlete.39 The NCAA Eligibility Center 
determines amateur certification of all potential student–athletes for 
Division I and II colleges and universities.40 There are eight categories of 
pre-NCAA enrollment activities that student–athletes may not participate in 
to become certified as an amateur, including accepting payments or 
preferential benefits for playing sports, accepting prize money above your 
expenses, and accepting benefits from an agent or prospective agent.41 Prior 
to the O’Bannon decision, that list contained receiving a salary for 
participating in athletics.42 After student–athletes receive their amateur 
certification, Division I and Division II schools are permitted to provide 
athletic scholarships that cover tuition and fees, room, board, and required 
course-related books.43 In addition, student–athletes may qualify for 
nonathletic financial aid such as merit academic scholarships and financial 
hardship-based aid such as federal Pell Grants.44 Although athletic 
scholarships may be awarded, the scholarships for Division I men’s 
basketball and FBS football do not always cover the full grant-in-aid,45 
which consists of tuition and all other expenses related to the cost of 
attendance.46 The cost of attendance differs from the grant-in-aid because it 
 
 37. See id. at 963; Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 
85, 120 (1984).  
 38. See NCAA 2015-16 GUIDE, supra note 25, at 24. 
 39. See id. 
 40. See id. 
 41. See id. (“The following activities may impact your amateur status: signing a contract with a 
professional team; playing with professionals; participating in tryouts or practices with a professional 
team; accepting payments or preferential benefits for playing sports; accepting prize money above your 
expenses; accepting benefits from an agent or prospective agent; agreeing to be represented by an agent; 
or delaying your full-time college enrollment to play in organized sports competitions.”). 
 42. See NCAA, 2014-15 GUIDE FOR THE COLLEGE-BOUND STUDENT–ATHLETE, 20 (2014), 
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/CBSA15.pdf [hereinafter NCAA 2014-15 GUIDE]. 
 43. See id. at 27; Schools in the NCAA are separated in divisions based on the size of the athletic 
program particularly the amount of men’s and women’s sports teams. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See NCAA 2015-16 MANUAL, supra note 31, at 189, art. 15.02.5 (“Financial aid that consists 
of tuition and fees, room and board, books, and other expenses related to attendance at the institution up 
to the cost of attendance established pursuant to Bylaws 15.02.2.”). 
 46. See id. at 188, art. 15.02.2 (“The ‘cost of attendance’ is an amount calculated by an 
institutional financial aid office, using federal regulations, that includes the total cost of tuition and fees, 
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encompasses the transportation expenses needed to attend an institution.47 
Since athletic scholarships did not cover the full cost of attending college, 
and student–athletes were not able to receive compensation for the use of 
their names, images, and likenesses, Edward O’Bannon challenged the 
NCAA’s rules under the Sherman Antitrust Act.48 
Under the Sherman Antitrust Act, it is illegal to form any “contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in the restraint 
of trade or commerce among the several States.”49 In order to prove a 
violation under § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, there must have been a 
contract, combination, or conspiracy that unreasonably restrained trade 
under either a rule of illegality or a rule of reason analysis and affected 
interstate commerce.50 The rule of reason51 is often the presumptive 
standard and used instead of the rule of illegality in situations where the 
restraint on competition is essential to the product’s availability.52 A 
restraint violates the rule of reason when the harm it places on competition 
outweighs its procompetitive effects.53 Initially, the burden is on the 
plaintiff to show that the restraint creates significant anticompetitive effects 
within the relevant market.54 Next, the burden shifts to the defendant to 
provide evidence of the restraint’s procompetitive effects.55 If the defendant 
satisfies this burden, then the plaintiff must provide less restrictive 
alternatives that can achieve the same objectives as the restraint.56 The 
NCAA has faced several antitrust challenges to its rules and regulations 
over the years.57 
 
room and board, books and supplies, transportation, and other expenses related to attendance at the 
institution.”).  
 47. Id. 
 48. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 49. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2015). 
 50. See Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Hairston v. Pacific 
10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
 51. See Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 
436 (6th Cir. 2008) (“The rule-of-reason test requires the court to analyze the actual effect on 
competition in a relevant market to determine whether the conduct unreasonably restrains trade.”). 
 52. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203 (2010) (citing Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984)).  
 53. See Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1063. 
 54. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 
120; In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 
2013); In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1147-48 (W.D. Wash. 
2005). 
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B. Past Challenges to the NCAA Regulations 
In 1984, the Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma brought 
an antitrust action against the NCAA challenging its plan to govern the 
televising of college football games.58 This case was the NCAA’s first 
attempt at using its preservation of amateurism as a defense for regulating 
college sports in an anticompetitive manner.59 Although the Supreme Court 
ultimately ruled against the NCAA, it supported the NCAA’s role in 
maintaining the tradition of amateurism in college sports.60 
Between 2008 and 2013, there were several cases involving former 
college athletes suing the NCAA, as well as Electronic Arts, Inc., for using 
the former athletes’ names, images, and likenesses in video games.61 
Several former student–athletes brought suits for right of publicity, but 
received mixed results against Electronic Arts, Inc. and were dismissed 
against the NCAA.62 As a result of the dismissals, the parties consolidated 
claims in the antitrust suit against the NCAA in the O’Bannon case.63 With 
both former and current athletes believing that the NCAA exploits their 
publicity rights, the overall purpose of the lawsuit was to abolish the 
NCAA’s rules prohibiting student–athlete compensation.64 
II. O’BANNON AND THE CURRENT STATE OF COLLEGIATE SPORTS 
For years, paying college athletes for licensing rights has been a topic 
of debate among sports analysts, professionals, and scholars, and even 
President Obama.65 The O’Bannon decision attempted to settle the debate, 
 
 58. See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 120 (holding that the NCAA actions created a 
monopoly in college football, but the rules were not illegal because it created competition in other 
sports). 
 59. See id. at 101 (stating that the NCAA has a historic role in preserving and encouraging 
intercollegiate amateur athletics). 
 60. See id. at 120. 
 61. See In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1272 
(9th Cir. 2013) (holding that Electronic Arts violated the plaintiff’s right of publicity for the use of his 
likeness in a video game); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 170 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that a 
former student–athlete did not qualify for right of publicity protection for use of his likeness as a 
photograph in a video game). 
 62. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d at 1272; see also 
Hart, 717 F.3d at 175-76. 
 63. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 962-63 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 64. See id. at 963. 
 65. See Dave Jamieson, Obama Calls On NCAA To Rethink The Way It Protects And Punishes 
Athletes, HUFFINGTON POST, (Mar. 21, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/21/obama-ncaa-
scholarships_n_6911804.html (quoting President Obama, “What does frustrate me is where I see 
coaches getting paid millions of dollars, athletic directors getting paid millions of dollars, the NCAA 
making huge amounts of money, and then some kid gets a tattoo or gets a free use of a car and suddenly 
they’re banished . . . [t]hat’s not fair”). 
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stating that the NCAA may not prohibit student–athlete compensation; 
however, it did not state that the NCAA had to compensate student–
athletes, which led to the NCAA simply removing licensing rights.66 
Although the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision to allow student–athletes 
to receive compensation for the use of their names, images, and likenesses, 
it vacated the district court’s suggested method for compensation.67 Along 
with this decision, the NCAA must consider the possibility of Title IX and 
tax problems when determining how to compensate student–athletes and 
maintain the amateurism of college sports.68 
A. O’Bannon v. NCAA: The District Court Decision 
In 2014, Edward O’Bannon led a group of former and current college 
student–athletes in an antitrust suit against the NCAA, challenging its 
restrictions on student–athlete compensation, specifically for Division I 
men’s basketball and FBS football players.69 The NCAA’s rules prohibited 
student–athletes from receiving compensation for the revenue generated 
through the NCAA and its member schools’ licensing of the rights to use 
student–athletes’ names, images, and likenesses in live game telecasts, 
videogames, and other archival footage such as highlights and 
rebroadcasts.70 The plaintiffs’ contention was that the restraint caused 
anticompetitive effects on the college-education and group-licensing 
markets.71 
1. Price Fixing in the College Education Market 
The college-education market is where colleges and universities 
compete for student–athletes to play FBS football or Division I men’s 
basketball.72 Each school offers higher education and athletic opportunities 
to recruits in exchange for their services and consent to use their names, 
images, and likenesses while enrolled; however, the athletes are responsible 
 
 66. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1007-08; Johnson, supra note 15, at 81 (quoting NCAA 
general counsel, Donald Remy, “We’re prepared to take this all the way to the Supreme Court if we 
have to”). 
 67. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 68. See Buzuvis, supra note 21, at 298. 
 69. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 963. 
 70. See id.; NCAA 2015-16 GUIDE, supra note 25, at 24 (stating that student–athletes may not 
receive payments or preferential benefits for playing sports). 
 71. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 963 (“Plaintiffs contend that these rules violate the Sherman 
Antitrust Act.”). 
 72. See id. at 965 (“[S]chools compete to sell unique bundles of goods and services to elite 
football and basketball recruits.”). 
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for any cost of attendance that is not covered in the scholarship.73 Price 
fixing occurs when the NCAA requires its schools to charge every recruit 
the same amount for this opportunity and prohibits schools from offering a 
lower cost and cash rebate.74 The NCAA contended that FBS football and 
Division I men’s basketball programs compete with programs from other 
divisions as well as minor leagues and foreign professional leagues,75 
which prevents them from price fixing in this market.76 
However, the plaintiffs argued that non-Division I colleges and 
universities generally offer lower levels of athletic competition, training 
facilities, and coaches.77 Additionally, Division II schools offer partial 
athletic scholarships, while Division III schools do not offer athletic 
scholarships at all, making the cost of attendance higher than FBS football 
and Division I basketball schools.78 Moreover, foreign professional and 
minor league79 opportunities do not offer the opportunity to earn a higher 
education.80 Therefore, the court held that Division I schools are in an 
exclusive market where the NCAA’s rules place a cap on the value of 
grant-in-aid that is offered to potential student–athletes and prevents 
student–athletes from receiving compensation for the use of their names, 
images, and likenesses.81 
 
 73. See id. at 966; Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student–
Athlete: the College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 118 (2006) [hereinafter Myth of the 
Student–Athlete] (“NCAA rules forbid players from accepting cash or other gifts from non-family 
members, and even gifts from family and guardians are limited to an amount which, when combined 
with any grant-in-aid, covers only the cost of attendance.”).  
 74. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 988 (“[I]n absence of this agreement, certain schools would 
compete for recruits by offering them a lower price for the opportunity to play FBS football or Division 
I basketball while they attend college.”). 
 75. See Chris Broussard, Exchange Student, ESPN, (May 19, 2009), 
http://www.espn.com/espnmag/story?id=3715746&section=magazine (stating that current NBA player 
Brandon Jennings elected to play and focus on the game of basketball in Italy because he did not reach 
the required minimum standardized test score to qualify for an NCAA scholarship). 
 76. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 987. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See id.; NCAA 2015-16 GUIDE, supra note 25, at 31 (“NCAA Divisions I and II schools 
provide more than $2.7 billion in athletics scholarships annually to more than 150,000 student–athletes. 
Division III schools do not offer athletics scholarships.”). 
 79. See Pete Thamel, D-League Graduate Sets New Course to the N.B.A. Draft, N.Y. TIMES, (June 
22, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/23/sports/basketball/23draft.html (identifying Latavious 
Williams as the first American high school player to choose to play in the NBA Development League 
instead of attending college). 
 80. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 987 (stating that professional leagues, like arena football, 
NBA developmental league, and foreign basketball and football, do not offer the same opportunities for 
higher education and national exposure as FBS football and Division I basketball). 
 81. See id. at 988-89 (citing White v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. CV 06-999-RGK 
MANX, 2006 WL 8066802 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2006)). 
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2. Price Fixing in the Group Licensing Market 
Within the group-licensing market are television networks, video-
game developers, and other third parties.82 These entities compete within 
their respective submarkets for group licenses to use the names, images, 
and likenesses of FBS football and Division I men’s basketball players in 
live telecasts, video games, and highlight clips.83 These entities are the 
primary users of student–athletes’ names, images, and likenesses, and are 
often very influential in determining which schools the athletes choose to 
attend because of the opportunities for exposure.84 
a. Live Game Telecasts 
Television networks negotiate deals exclusively with the universities 
and conferences to acquire student–athletes’ rights because the NCAA 
prohibits student–athletes from licensing the rights to their names, images, 
and likenesses.85 However, the court noted that even without the NCAA’s 
restrictions, it is not certain that there would be competition between 
groups of student–athletes to sell the rights for the use of their names, 
images, and likenesses.86 Furthermore, competition is unlikely because a 
television network would have to obtain licenses from every team that 
could potentially participate in a particular athletic event such as a playoff, 
bowl, or championship game.87 Since there was not a direct restraint on 
competition in this particular market, the court held that the NCAA rules 
did not harm competition under the Sherman Antitrust Act.88 
b. Video Games 
Videogame developers and intermediate buyers compete for group 
licenses to use student–athletes’ names, images, and likenesses.89 The 
NCAA contended that this market would not exist even if student–athletes 
were permitted to sell their rights because some conferences recently 
 
 82. See id. at 993. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See id. (stating that television networks compete for the rights to telecast lives games); Ahmed 
E. Taha, Are College Athletes Economically Exploited?, 2 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 69, 87 (2012) 
(“Successful, popular teams appear often on national television, giving media exposure to the student–
athletes on the team.”). 
 85. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 993-94. 
 86. See id. at 995. 
 87. See id. (“For instance, a network seeking to telecast a conference basketball tournament would 
have to obtain group licenses from all of the teams in that conference.”). 
 88. See id. 
 89. See id. at 997 (describing intermediate buyers as those who bundle student–athletes’ rights 
with others’ rights to sell them to video game developers). 
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decided to stop licensing their intellectual property for use in video 
games.90 However, the court noted that developers do not need all NCAA 
schools and conferences to create a video game.91 As long as there are a 
sufficient number of schools, there is competition in this market, and 
student–athletes’ group licenses could possibly exist.92 Even though 
competition could exist in this market, the court held that it is unlikely 
because past video games often included almost every FBS football and 
Division I men’s basketball school and conference.93 Moreover, the 
challenged NCAA rules do not affect competition because trade within this 
market has stopped due to lawsuits against videogame developers such as 
Electronic Arts, Inc.94 
c. Game Rebroadcasts, Highlight Clips, and Other Archival Footage 
The NCAA uses a third-party agent, T3Media, which is assigned to 
negotiate and manage all licensing related to archival footage.95 T3Media is 
prohibited from licensing any current student–athletes’ footage and is 
required to obtain the right to use the names, images, and likenesses of any 
former student–athlete that appears in licensed footage.96 Under these 
arrangements, no current or former student–athletes are deprived of 
compensation for the use of their names, images, and likenesses in 
rebroadcasted games.97 As a result, the court held that there is no 
opportunity for competition in this market for any former student–athlete 
that decides not to relinquish the rights to use his name, image, or likeness 
in the rebroadcast of archival footage because a license is needed from 
every team that has ever competed in order to license all of the NCAA’s 
 
 90. See id. (stating that without the NCAA and its conferences’ intellectual property, the video 
game developers would not be able to produce a marketable product). 
 91. See id.  
 92. See id. (“Mr. Linzner specifically testified at trial that [Electronic Arts, Inc.] remains 
interested in acquiring the rights to use student–athletes’ names, images, and likenesses and would seek 
to acquire them if not for the NCAA’s challenged rules . . . .”). 
 93. See id. at 998.  
 94. See id. 
 95. See id. (defining archival footage as game rebroadcasts, highlight clips, and other footage for 
entertainment and advertisement).  
 96. See id.; NCAA, Digital Highlight and Footage Use Policy for Participating Member 
Institutions and Conferences, NCAA DIGITAL 
http://i.turner.ncaa.com/sites/default/files/images/2015/04/28/2014-
15_ncaa_champs_digital_highlights_policy_-_schools_-_version_2.pdf (“For the NCAA Division I 
Championships . . . [d]igital [h]ighlights may be used from NCAA.com or they must be licensed from 
T3 Media.”). 
 97. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 998. 
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footage.98 Therefore, the NCAA’s restrictions have not restrained trade for 
student–athletes in the group licensing market.99 
3. NCAA’s Procompetitive Justifications for Restraint 
As stated in the National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents 
of University of Oklahoma, the alleged purpose of the NCAA’s restrictions 
was to preserve amateurism in college sports.100 The idea is that preserving 
amateurism helps the NCAA maintain competition among universities, 
integrate academics and athletics, and increase the national exposure of 
college sports.101 While the NCAA contended that amateurism has always 
been focused on the student–athlete receiving an education, history shows 
that the amateurism rules have not remained consistent.102 
a. Preserving Amateurism 
Throughout the years, the NCAA has made crucial changes to its 
amateurism rules.103 Initially, amateurism began with participation in sports 
solely for pleasure and prohibited student–athlete recruitment using illicit 
payments.104 However, many schools ignored these rules, leading to the 
development of the Sanity Code, which provided enforcement in awarding 
financial aid without considering athletic ability.105 Just a few years after 
implementing the Sanity Code, the NCAA again changed its rules, 
allowing schools to award athletic scholarships.106 The court stated that 
with the current restrictions on student–athlete compensation, it is difficult 
for the NCAA to use amateurism as a legal justification because the cap 
that is placed on athletic-based financial aid does not support a focus 
toward higher education for student–athletes.107 Rather, the cap on athletic-
 
 98. See id. (stating that a group of student–athletes would not have an incentive to compete). 
 99. See id. 
 100. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 
(1984) (“The NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a revered tradition of amateurism in 
college sports.”). 
 101. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 999-1004. 
 102. See id. at 973 (“The historical evidence presented at trial, however, demonstrates that the 
association’s amateurism rules have not been nearly as consistent as Dr. Emmert represents.”). 
 103. See id. at 974. 
 104. See id. (“[T]he association adopted a new rule stating that an amateur was ‘one who 
participates in competitive physical sports only for pleasure, and the physical, mental, moral, and social 
benefits directly derived therefrom.’”). 
 105. Id. (“The Sanity Code required that financial aid be awarded without consideration of 
[athletic] ability.”). 
 106. See id. (“In 1956, the NCAA enacted a new set of amateurism rules permitting schools to 
award athletic scholarships to student–athletes.”). 
 107. See id. at 975. 
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based financial aid is more likely to entice men’s basketball and football 
student–athletes, who have the opportunity, to focus more on their athletic 
endeavors because of the possibility of becoming professional athletes.108 
b. Maintaining Competition Among Universities 
The NCAA introduced the idea of competitive balance as a reason for 
its compensation restraints.109 The NCAA’s view was that maintaining a 
certain level of competitive balance is necessary to create and sustain 
consumer demand for Division I men’s basketball and FBS football.110 
However, the court stated that the restrictions have not shown any impact 
on competition.111 Rather than compensating student–athletes, schools 
merely spend more money on coaches and personnel, recruiting trips, and 
training facilities.112 The current situation would be no different than a 
scenario where student–athletes were compensated because the schools 
with the largest budgets would always attract the cream of the crop.113 
c. Integrating Academics and Athletics 
The NCAA claims that its restrictions promote the integration of 
education and athletics.114 In particular, the NCAA stated that student–
athletes generally have better academic and employment opportunities than 
other people from their socioeconomic backgrounds.115 However, the 
 
 108. See Jeffery L. Harrison & Casey C. Harrison, The Law and Economics of the NCAA’s Claim 
to Monopsony Rights, 54 ANTITRUST BULL. 923, 948 (2009) (stating that athletes would be more likely 
to stay in college longer if they were earning some income for the use of their names, images, and 
likenesses).  
 109. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 978. 
 110. See id. 
 111. Id. (relying Dr. Noll’s testimony, which presented studies from numerous sports economists 
showing that the NCAA’s amateurism rules do not have a substantial effect on its desired level of 
competitive balance). 
 112. See id.; Chris Isidore, College Coaches Make More Money Than Players Get in Scholarships, 
CNNMONEY, (Jan. 11, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/01/11/news/companies/college-coaches-pay-
players-scholarships/ (stating that during the 2014–2015 school year, 535 coaches in men’s college 
sports earned a total of $440 million, while a total of $426 million was spent on male student–athlete 
scholarships). 
 113. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 979; Matthew J. Parlow, The Potential Unintended 
Consequences of the O’Bannon Decision, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 203, 208 (2014) (“[A] 
dramatic increase in college athletic compensation could create a tale of two universities—that is, a 
small group of well-funded colleges and universities that would able to pay the elite high school 
athletes to matriculate on the one hand and the vast majority of other schools that would be unable to 
compete for elite talent on the other hand.”). 
 114. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 979; Taha, supra note 84, at 83 (“As a group, football and 
men’s basketball players enter college with lesser academic skills and aptitudes than do other students 
at their colleges.”). 
 115. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 980 (“Dr. Heckman found that these benefits are particularly 
pronounced for student–athletes from disadvantaged backgrounds.”). 
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NCAA’s claim failed to consider college athletes from socioeconomic 
backgrounds with higher incomes who could afford to attend college 
without an athletic scholarship.116 Although student–athletes tend to have 
employment and academic benefits, the NCAA did not provide evidence 
that its restrictions on student–athlete compensation are the specific reason 
for these benefits.117 
However, one the NCAA’s experts made a plausible argument that 
compensating college athletes with large sums of money could cause a 
separation between the student–athletes and the rest of the student body on 
campus.118 With such a large income from their success, student–athletes 
may be more inclined to socialize off-campus and become sidetracked from 
their academic endeavors.119 Even with these possible hindrances to 
student–athletes’ academic and educational values, the court held that the 
NCAA’s restraints on student–athlete compensation did not serve to 
enhance academic success for college athletes.120 
d. Increasing Exposure 
The NCAA believes its regulations on amateurism increase the 
number of opportunities that schools and student–athletes have to compete 
on a national level.121 The NCAA and its conference officials’ claim is that 
the upward trend in participation in FBS football and Division I men’s 
basketball is because of the commitment to amateurism as opposed to the 
increased revenue and televised exposure.122 Moreover, because of the 
restrictions, lower income schools can afford to participate in Division I 
competition.123 Yet, some schools in major conferences have expressed 
desire to change the restrictions on amateurism.124 In addition, there was no 
 
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. (stating that student–athletes enjoy long-term benefits from “their increased access to 
financial aid, tutoring, academic support, mentorship, structured schedules, and other educational 
services that are unrelated to the challenged rules in this case”). 
 118. See id. (presenting testimony from university administrators stating, “depending on how much 
compensation [is] ultimately awarded, some student–athletes [may] receive more money from the 
school than their professors”); Johnson, supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 119. See Johnson, supra note 15 (“The bottom line is that the focus should be and remain on higher 
education.”). 
 120. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1003 (“As with the NCAA’s amateurism justification, 
however, the NCAA may not use this goal to justify its sweeping prohibition on any student–athlete 
compensation, paid now or in the future, from licensing revenue generated from the use of student–
athletes’ names, images, and likenesses.”). 
 121. See id. at 1003-04. 
 122. See id. at 1004 (stating that the NCAA attracts schools with its commitment to amateurism). 
 123. See id.  
 124. See id. (“[S]ome Division I conferences have sought greater autonomy from the NCAA 
specifically so that they could enact their own rules, including new scholarship rules.”). 
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evidence showing that allowing compensation would prevent low-income 
school participation.125 This led the district court to believe that allowing 
student–athletes to receive compensation could not only increase 
participation in Division I athletics, but also create more opportunities for 
national exposure to college sports in general.126 
4. Alternative Restrictions and Remedies 
The district court proposed several alternative restrictions and 
remedies that would allow the NCAA to comply with fair competition.127 
First, the court stated that the NCAA could allow Division I men’s 
basketball and FBS football student–athletes to receive stipends from 
schools up to the full cost of attendance with funds generated from 
licensing revenues.128 Alternatively, the court stated that the NCAA could 
permit schools to have a trust holding limited and equal shares of their 
respective licensing revenues to be distributed to the student–athletes after 
they leave college or their eligibility has expired.129 
After exploring possible alternative restrictions and remedies to the 
NCAA’s rules against compensation, the district court concluded that the 
NCAA’s challenged rules unreasonably restrained trade and violated the 
Sherman Antitrust Act.130 The court specified that prohibiting student–
athletes from ever receiving any compensation for the use of their names, 
images, and likenesses restrains price competition among Division I 
schools as suppliers of an unique combination of academic and athletic 
opportunities.131 This decision ultimately led to an appeal as well as the 
NCAA increasing the value of athletic scholarships to cover the full cost of 
attendance and allowing its member schools to grant deferred cash 
payments up to $5,000 per year.132 
 
 125. See id. (“[T]here is no evidence that those cost savings are being used to fund additional teams 
or scholarships.”). 
 126. See id. 
 127. See id. at 982. 
 128. See id. at 1005; Edelman, supra note 27, at 2335 (“[R]aising the permissible grant-in-aid limit 
that schools may award to their athletes in stipends.”). 
 129. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1005 (stating that NCAA could limit compensation to only the 
revenue generated from the licensing of student–athletes’ names, images, and likenesses). 
 130. See id. at 1007 (“The challenged rules do not promote competitive balance among FBS 
football and Division I basketball teams, let alone produce a level of competitive balance necessary to 
sustain existing consumer demand for the NCAA’s FBS football and Division I basketball-related 
products.”). 
 131. See id. (“The challenged rules do not promote competitive balance among FBS football and 
Division I basketball teams, let alone produce a level of competitive balance necessary to sustain 
existing consumer demand for the NCAA’s FBS football and Division I basketball-related products.”). 
 132. See Berkowitz, supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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B. The NCAA Appeals to the Ninth Circuit 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that 
the NCAA’s rules against compensating student–athletes for the use of 
their names, images, and likenesses violated the Sherman Antitrust Act.133 
Furthermore, the Court affirmed the district court’s decision that student–
athletes were injured as a result of the NCAA’s compensation rules because 
such rules have closed the market for using the students’ names, images, 
and likenesses in video games.134 While the Court reaffirmed the decision 
to allow NCAA member schools to award grants-in-aid up to the full cost 
of attendance, it vacated the decision to allow students to receive cash 
payments for the use of their names, images, and likenesses.135 The Court 
reasoned that neither a rule against nor a rule permitting compensating 
student–athletes for their names, images, and likenesses would be effective 
in promoting amateurism and preserving the consumer demand.136 Even 
though the NCAA’s restrictions violated the Sherman Antitrust Act, the 
Court stated that providing students with cash compensation would deprive 
the NCAA of its core value of amateurism.137 Likewise, compensating 
students with yearly cash payments would convert college athletics from an 
amateur league to a minor league.138 Further, the majority noted that the 
district court incorrectly reasoned that allowing smaller cash payments as 
opposed to larger payments would preserve amateurism.139 The Court 
believed the problem is that offering student–athletes compensation 
unrelated to educational expenses erases the rule of amateurism.140 
However, the dissent stated that based on the experts’ testimony, 
allowing students to receive small payments would not have a significant 
effect on consumer demand.141 In fact, one of the experts established that 
consumer interest rose in professional sports when salaries increased, but 
this analogy conflicts with collegiate athletics because the focus is toward 
 
 133. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 134. See id. at 1067 (“[Electronic Arts, Inc.’s] inability to use college athletes’ [names, images, and 
likenesses] was the ‘number one factor holding back NCAA video game growth.’”). 
 135. See id. at 1075-77. 
 136. See id. at 1076. 
 137. See id. (stating that “amateurism is an integral part to the NCAA’s market”). 
 138. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102 
(1984) (stating that college sports must be differentiated from professional sports unless they become 
minor leagues). 
 139. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1077 (stating that the district court should have addressed the 
effectiveness of smaller cash payments in promoting amateurism). 
 140. See id. at 1078. 
 141. See id. at 1080 (basing its argument on the fact that FBS football players can receive Pell 
grants in excess of the cost of attendance and tennis players may receive prize money up to $10,000 
prior to enrolling in school). 
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amateurism.142 The primary distinction between the majority and dissenting 
opinions is whether the antitrust analysis should be focused toward 
amateurism or consumer demand.143 
While maintaining both amateurism and consumer demand are 
essential to resolving this dispute, other legal problems may arise.144 The 
NCAA faces Title IX issues when considering compensating only men’s 
basketball and football players.145 Further, the NCAA faces the possibility 
of income taxes, which is contrary to its amateurism policy.146 
III. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE O’BANNON DECISION 
The central dispute throughout O’Bannon was compensating Division 
I men’s basketball and FBS football student–athletes for the revenue 
generated from licensing their names, images, and likeness.147 While the 
NCAA’s concern was maintaining the amateurism and consumer demand 
of college sports, the decision nonetheless brought about other potential 
legal problems.148 In addition to determining the best approach to 
compensating student–athletes, the NCAA faces a Title IX obstacle and 
possible problems with income taxes for the money it could potentially 
provide to the student–athletes.149 
A. Drop a Dime for Title IX 
Educational institutions, particularly their athletic departments, are 
constantly monitoring their activities to ensure that they are in compliance 
with Title IX.150 Title IX is a civil rights law commonly known for 
 
 142. See id. at 1081 (stating that the popularity of major league baseball increased when players’ 
salaries rose). 
 143. See id. (Thomas, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the difference in opinion refers to the 
procompetitive interest at stake and whether the alternative of compensating student–athletes is as 
effective in preserving amateurism). 
 144. See id.; Parlow, supra note 113, at 212 (“Just as importantly, there will almost certainly be 
Title IX implications and effects based on the O’Bannon decision and potential changes in the 
collegiate athletic system.”). 
 145. See Buzuvis, supra note 21 (“[T]he NCAA argues that paying athletes in revenue sports, 
coupled with the commensurate obligation under Title IX to pay female athletes, would be prohibitively 
expensive for college athletics as we know it.”). 
 146. See Kissa-Schulze, supra note 23. 
 147. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 963 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 148. See Buzuvis, supra note 21 and accompanying text; Kissa-Schulze, supra note 23. 
 149. See Buzuvis, supra note 21 and accompanying text; Kissa-Schulze, supra note 23. 
 150. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(c) (2014) (“Any public or private preschool, elementary, or secondary 
school, or any institution of vocational, professional, or higher education, except that in the case of an 
educational institution composed of more than one school, college, or department which are 
administratively separate units, such term means each such school, college, or department.”). 
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prohibiting discrimination against women in programs or activities that 
receive federal financial assistance such as college sports.151 The primary 
concern is preferential treatment with the imbalance in participation or 
receipt of federal benefits such as financial assistance to members of one 
sex.152 
In order to comply with Title IX, colleges and universities must offer 
an equal amount of funds to women’s athletics as they do to men’s 
athletics.153 Unfortunately, female college athletic programs typically do 
not generate the same amount of revenue as male college athletic 
programs.154 As shown in the figures below, which provide the revenues, 
expenses, and profits of the University of Florida’s men and women’s 
athletic programs, usually only the men’s basketball and football programs 
generate a profit for the athletic department.155 
 
FIGURE 1: Men’s Sports 
 
 Revenue Expense Profit 
Football $63,951,571.00 $19,707,442.00 $44,244,129.00 
Basketball $9,464,520.00 $6,866,541.00 $2,597,979.00 
Baseball $541,073.00 $1,678,780.00 -$1,137,707.00 
Tennis $9,867.00 $507,705.00 -$497,838.00 
Golf $14,400.00 $375,499.00 -$361,099.00 
  Total $44,845,464.00 
 
 151. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2014) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any 
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”). 
 152. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2014) (“Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section shall be 
interpreted to require any educational institution to grant preferential or disparate treatment to the 
members of one sex on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or 
percentage of persons of that sex participating in or receiving the benefits of any federally supported 
program or activity, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of that sex in any 
community, State, section, or other area: *Provided*, That this subsection shall not be construed to 
prevent the consideration in any hearing or proceeding under this chapter of statistical evidence tending 
to show that such an imbalance exists with respect to the participation in, or receipt of the benefits of, 
any such program or activity by the members of one sex.”). 
 153. See Buzuvis, supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 154. See id. at 320; Kristi Dosh, Which Sports Turn A Profit?, THE BUSINESS OF COLLEGE SPORTS, 
(July 19, 2011), http://businessofcollegesports.com/2011/07/19/which-sports-turn-a-profit/. 
 155. See infra Figures 1-2; Dosh, supra note 154 (showing the profits from the University of 
Florida’s men’s and women’s athletic programs). 
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FIGURE 2: Women’s Sports 
 
 Revenue Expense Profit 
Golf $4,932.00 $314,413.00 -$309,481.00 
Basketball $45,361.00 $2,182,324.00 -$2,135,963.00 
Tennis $0.00 $516,992.00 -$516,992.00 
Soccer $0.00 $757,538.00 -$757,538.00 
Volleyball $78,418.00 $1,008,438.00 -$930,020.00 
Softball $39,655.00 $908,338.00 -$868,683.00 
Gymnastics $236,819.00 $1,063,242.00 -$826,423.00 
Lacrosse $0.00 $600,624.00 -$600,624.00 
  Total -$6,946,724.00 
 
This dynamic is the same for schools across the country; therefore, 
many believe that providing an equal amount of funds to women’s athletics 
will decrease the amount of money that each university is willing to 
provide to their student–athletes.156 Since college sports is a multibillion-
dollar growth industry,157 it is hard to believe that schools would reserve 
the amount of money they are willing to provide for student–athletes and 
pass up the opportunity to enroll the top recruits in college sports.158 
In determining how to distribute funds, schools weigh the college 
“educational athletic programs”159 versus “commercial athletic 
programs.”160 Education-based athletic programs would allow schools to 
evenly distribute funds throughout the athletic department to women’s 
sports because less money spent on recruiting football and basketball 
prospects would alleviate the pressure to generate revenue from those 
 
 156. See Marc Edelman, The Future of Amateurism After Antitrust Scrutiny: Why a Win for the 
Plaintiffs in the NCAA Student–athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation Will Not Lead to the 
Demise of College Sports, 92 OREGON L. REV. 1019, 1047 (2014). 
 157. See Will Hobson & Steven Rich, Playing in The Red, WASHINGTON POST, (Nov. 23, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/sports/wp/2015/11/23/running-up-the-bills/. 
 158. See Trail of Tears, supra note 16, at 646. 
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sports.161 Furthermore, the idea is that educational programs save money 
from electing not to give athletic scholarships and only competing with 
regional schools.162 However, a commercial athletic program has the ability 
to generate money outside of its affiliation with the academic institution.163 
These programs are largely more successful in maximizing profits from 
recruiting the top athletes and competing against other major programs 
across the country, but are constantly determining how to distribute funds 
to less profitable women’s athletics.164 Consequently, if the NCAA decides 
that it will compensate Division I men’s basketball and FBS football 
student–athletes, it must determine how to factor in compensating women’s 
athletes as well as the possibility of income taxes.165 
B. Taxation Without Representation 
While the tax issue as a whole is beyond the scope of this note, it is 
important to briefly identify the ramifications when considering the idea of 
compensating student–athletes for the use of their names, images, and 
likenesses.166 Since states have a constitutional right to tax, paid student–
athletes would be subject to federal and state income taxation.167 Such a 
situation would ultimately make student–athletes employees of their 
respective schools, which is a contradiction of the NCAA’s focus toward 
amateurism.168 Additionally, the big-name college athletic programs within 
the top five conferences169 would have a competitive advantage as well as 
the power to control where all of the best recruits go to school.170 Even 
though schools within the top five conferences already control a large 
portion of the recruiting market, their power would increase because of the 
amount of money they have to offer in compensation.171 
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Depending upon how much money the student–athlete receives and 
the state in which he chooses to attend school, he may be subject to state 
income taxes.172 Most states have a different income-tax percentage, while 
some do not have an income tax at all, which may affect where potential 
student–athletes choose to attend school.173 Schools with more money will 
still have the power to entice potential student–athletes to enroll at their 
university because the earning opportunities are high regardless of the state 
income-tax percentage.174 However, schools in states with no income tax 
could begin to dominate the recruiting market.175 Since schools often solicit 
athletes to transfer with opportunities for more playing time, the additional 
incentive of lower or non-taxable income could increase student–athlete 
transferring across the nation.176 A situation like this could disrupt the 
competitive balance among college sports and certainly redirect a student–
athlete’s emphasis toward monetary goals instead of academics.177 
While O’Bannon precludes the NCAA from prohibiting student–
athlete compensation, the NCAA intends to maintain an emphasis on 
academics.178 Furthermore, with Title IX and tax implications lingering as 
potential obstacles, it could be difficult for the NCAA to compensate 
athletes and maintain its core values.179 However, a viable solution is to 
allow schools to compensate student–athletes with merit–based 
scholarships.180 
IV. SHOW THEM THE MONEY: HOW TO COMPENSATE ALL STUDENT–
ATHLETES 
The major economic advancement that O’Bannon has provided to 
college athletes is a well-deserved victory.181 For years, student–athletes 
have increased the demand and revenue for their respective colleges and 
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universities, the NCAA, and collegiate sports in general, but have not 
received any compensation.182 Nonetheless, this remedy provides other 
legal questions, some of which are not as easy to answer.183 Title IX may 
be an easy problem to solve, but allowing student–athletes to receive 
compensation for the use of their names, images, and likenesses while 
maintaining the amateurism of college athletics is more of a daunting task, 
especially when coupled with tax implications.184 After the Court of 
Appeals decided that the NCAA did not have to compensate student–
athletes with yearly deferred cash payments in excess of the cost of 
attendance, there seemed to be no reasonable alternative to provide 
payments to college athletes while maintaining the NCAA’s amateur 
status.185 
However, a viable solution to this dilemma is for the NCAA to allow 
schools to use the revenue generated from licensing student–athletes’ 
names, images, and likenesses to create performance-based scholarships.186 
The scholarships would be granted from both schools and conferences to 
the student–athletes that excel in both academic and athletic endeavors.187 
The scholarships would be awarded at the end of each semester so that 
students’ grades are factored in to determining the eligibility of the 
potential recipients.188 Moreover, the performance-based scholarship 
opportunities would be available in every NCAA sport at each respective 
school like the NCAA All-American and All-Conference awards.189 Those 
who support paying student–athletes may argue that this solution is not a 
plausible remedy because it does not fully compensate all revenue-
generating athletes.190 While this solution does not compensate all Division 
I men’s basketball and FBS football student–athletes, it does create an 
additional remedy to the O’Bannon decision since there is a void of 
direction for the NCAA.191 Moreover, the scholarship amounts could be 
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structured relative to the popularity of the sport, meaning that the Division I 
men’s basketball and FBS football scholarships would be more lucrative 
than all of the nonrevenue-generating sports like tennis or golf.192 
On the other hand, those against paying student–athletes may argue 
that awards of large amounts could take away from the amateur aspect of 
the NCAA and change the focus toward a monetary goal.193 Yet, any award 
amount under $10,000 could be considered within the scope of 
amateurism.194 For example, college tennis players are allowed to gain 
amateur status even if they have received up to $10,000 in prize money 
prior to enrolling in college.195 To ensure that the awards are not too large, 
the cap on the scholarships would be set to $5,000, which was the same 
amount proposed for the deferred cash payments.196 However, unlike the 
deferred cash payments, performance-based scholarships allow student–
athletes to maintain their amateur status because the awards are tied to 
education: These awards are based upon the merit of their academic 
achievements in addition to athletics.197 
This solution, in addition to the Court of Appeals authorizing the 
NCAA to allow schools to award athletic scholarships up to the full cost of 
attendance, would compensate male and female student–athletes in both 
revenue and nonrevenue generating sports.198 Moreover, this solution 
would provide future college athletes with the opportunity to consent to 
licensing their names, images, and likenesses in the live telecast, video 
game, and archival footage markets.199 Lastly, this solution allows the 
NCAA to maintain its core value of amateurism in college sports while 
preventing student–athletes from becoming employees and subjecting 
themselves to income taxes.200 Overall, merit-based academic and athletic 
scholarships are the most reasonable solution to compensating student–
athletes for the revenue generated from licensing their names, images, and 
likenesses without jeopardizing amateurism.201 
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A. Compensating Male and Female Student–athletes 
Title IX is an obstacle that all colleges and universities will need to 
comply with even though O’Bannon only requires paying Division I men’s 
basketball and FBS football student–athletes.202 Although women’s college 
sports programs typically do not generate as much revenue as their male 
counterparts, it is essential that women’s athletics receive an equal amount 
of funding to prevent discrimination scrutiny under Title IX.203 While some 
may argue that paying both male and female student–athletes limits the 
amount of funds that are available because the funds will be split in half, it 
is the only way for schools to avoid a potential lawsuit from any female 
college athlete.204 
The solution to this problem is not only providing performance-based 
scholarships to women’s basketball and softball players, who are usually 
the most popular among women’s college athletics, but also providing 
merit scholarships to all student–athletes.205 Even though FBS football and 
Division I men’s basketball are the bread winners in collegiate athletics, 
nonrevenue-generating sports programs should also be entitled to the 
opportunity to receive performance-based scholarships.206 Since it is likely 
that only revenue-generating athletes will be allowed to receive athletic 
scholarships up to the full cost of attendance, providing merit-based 
scholarships to nonrevenue-generating athletes as well creates a balance 
among collegiate athletics.207 In terms of public policy, creating a balance 
among the various college sports is essential to promoting fairness, which 
would help prevent lawsuits against the NCAA for only accommodating 
FBS football and Division I men’s basketball players.208 
The rebuttal to any solution involving paying student–athletes is the 
question of where the money will come from.209 However, the excess 
money from the years of limited grant-in-aid to student–athletes may be 
used to distribute funds throughout college athletics.210 Moreover, another 
source of funding would be the portion of revenue, generated from 
licensing student–athletes’ names, images, and likenesses, that was 
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previously used to consistently update training facilities and overpay 
coaches and training staff.211 Because the NCAA was concerned that 
money would separate student–athletes from the rest of the college student 
body, one would believe that the NCAA wants to maintain equality 
throughout collegiate athletics.212 Therefore, this solution to compensate 
both male and female student–athletes in all sports through performance-
based scholarships would coincide with the NCAA’s vision of promoting 
fairness and equality.213 
B. Student–athlete Consent Options 
The next dilemma is slightly more difficult than the Title IX 
problem.214 Because the NCAA can no longer prevent student–athletes 
from receiving compensation for licensing their names, images, and 
likenesses, the task is determining how to allow compensation without 
destroying the amateurism of collegiate athletics.215 The proposal is to 
modify the amateur status requirements and provide student–athletes with 
the opportunity to consent to the use of their names, images, and 
likenesses.216 A consent form would be presented upon the student–
athlete’s acceptance to enrolling at the university.217 With this form, the 
student–athlete may either consent to the use of his or her name, image, and 
likeness in live game broadcast, video games, and highlight clips, or merely 
choose to not be identified in such media markets.218 While consent to this 
form does waive the student–athlete’s right to bring action on that matter, it 
prevents him from destroying his amateur certification.219 However, when 
the student–athlete consents to the NCAA licensing on his behalf, he will 
be eligible to receive a portion of the revenue through the performance-
based scholarships.220 Moreover, this option would allow the NCAA to 
reopen the college video game market that has been shut down due to cases 
like Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc. and Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., both of 
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which involved students suing for right to publicity and later joining the 
O’Bannon case.221 
It is arguable that this option is no different from the NCAA’s current 
restrictions because it does not guarantee that student–athletes will receive 
a portion of the revenue that they generate.222 However, with the consent 
option the result is that the athlete is able to remain an amateur instead of 
having to consider the foreign professional or minor league opportunities 
that some athletes have chosen due to their academic issues.223 
Furthermore, without consenting to allow the NCAA to control licensing, 
the student–athlete not only passes on an opportunity to possibly receive 
more compensation, but he also passes on the chance for exposure through 
each of the relevant media markets.224 
Conversely, there is the possibility that some incoming student–
athletes may choose to opt out of licensing their names, images, and 
likenesses through the NCAA.225 In this situation, each of those students 
may attempt to license their names, images, and likenesses directly in each 
market, which could start a trend of students contracting their own 
licensing agreements.226 However, it is more likely that student–athletes 
would be unsuccessful in that attempt because the media markets would 
prefer to have group licensing contracts rather than individual licensing 
contracts.227 Additionally, television networks and third-party agents such 
as T3Media only contract licensing deals exclusively with the NCAA or its 
member conferences and schools.228 Thus, providing a licensing consent 
option for incoming student–athletes, would allow the NCAA to minimize 
future legal issues involving compensation.229 Likewise, student–athletes 
could maximize their compensation opportunities with consent to the 
NCAA licensing option.230 
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C. Paying Student–athletes Without Taxation 
The final issue, and arguably the most difficult of the three, is 
developing a means of compensating student–athletes while avoiding state 
and federal tax implications.231 Student–athletes may not necessarily be 
subject to state taxes, depending on the state they attend school, but would 
certainly be subject to federal income taxes.232 The problem is allowing the 
athletes to receive the money they deserve, while preventing them from 
reaching employee status.233 Making student–athletes into employees 
would certainly defeat any purpose of having the “student” part of 
“student–athletes” because the free education is supposed to be their 
compensation.234 In addition, many student–athletes already focus heavily 
on preparing for competition at both the collegiate and professional level, 
but never apply the same amount of effort in the classroom.235 
However, with the amount of revenue that the NCAA’s schools 
generate from student–athletes through the licensing of their names, 
images, and likenesses, many believe college athletes are entitled to more 
compensation.236 Those who are against paying student–athletes consider 
the tax issue a major problem because of the effects it could have on the 
recruiting aspect of college sports.237 The belief is that certain states will 
have an advantage because of their lower income tax rates, which would 
ultimately disrupt the competitive balance.238 While this stance opposing 
compensation may be valid, rewarding athletes through performance-based 
scholarships would solve the tax dilemma.239 
Scholarships based on performance in the classroom and on the 
playing field would provide compensation while preventing student–
athletes from subjecting themselves to income taxes.240 The Internal 
Revenue Service allows tax-free scholarships for students at eligible 
educational institutions so long as it does not exceed the individual’s 
qualified educational expenses, meaning expenses needed for attendance or 
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enrollment.241 Some may argue that scholarships based on athletic 
performance would entice students to direct even more attention to their 
athletic endeavors.242 However, the scholarships would also be geared 
toward educational values because academic achievement in addition to 
athletic performance would be necessary to qualify for the awards.243 
Therefore, linking academic achievement with athletic success, will 
provide student–athletes with the opportunity to gain compensation without 
taxation.244 
D. The Benefits of Performance-Based Scholarships 
Performance-based scholarships provide the NCAA with the same 
amount of benefits as each of its alleged procompetitive justifications for 
restricting student–athlete compensation.245 Although they are not 
necessary, performance scholarships would be a reasonable alternative to 
the NCAA’s restriction on compensation from revenue generated through 
the licensing of student–athletes’ names, images, and likenesses.246 With 
proper implementation, the NCAA would be able to preserve amateurism, 
maintain competition among its member schools, and integrate academics 
and athletics—all while increasing its national exposure.247 
Throughout its history, the NCAA has maintained an emphasis on 
preserving amateurism in college sports.248 While the rules against 
compensation functioned to prevent the NCAA from becoming a minor 
league system to professional leagues such as the National Basketball 
Association and National Football League, the rules also exploited college 
athletes.249 O’Bannon exposed the flaws in the NCAA’s technique to 
preserving amateurism, but failed to completely resolve the student–athlete 
compensation issue.250 Nonetheless, through performance-based 
scholarships, the NCAA could compensate student–athletes without 
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providing it in a manner that would transform college sports into a minor-
league system and ruin its amateur status.251 Furthermore, since the 
scholarships would only go to the top-performing student–athletes, 
competition among players and schools would increase.252 
The NCAA believes that its restrictions on student–athlete 
compensation allow it to maintain competition among its member 
schools.253 However, performance-based scholarships would also maintain 
competition among NCAA schools provided that the conferences are 
allowed to award them to student–athletes.254 With conferences providing 
scholarships to the top-performing student–athletes from schools within 
their respective conferences, schools with the most scholarship-winning 
students are now able to pitch another benefit when recruiting future 
athletes.255 Although the NCAA will always have disparity among schools 
because of size and revenue, competition among schools to recruit the best 
athletes would increase because the schools with more successful students 
would develop a reputation for exceling in both academics and athletics.256 
While performance scholarships would maintain and even increase 
competition among schools, it would also further the integration of 
education and athletics.257 
Implementing performance-based scholarships would contribute to the 
integration of academics and athletics.258 Although those who oppose 
compensating student–athletes believe it would create a distinct separation 
between education and sports, it would actually tie both together and 
promote achievement in each endeavor.259 Since eligibility for the 
scholarships would be based on athletic performance as well as academic 
achievement, student–athletes are encouraged to excel in academics.260 
This would motivate student–athletes to excel in other endeavors besides 
sports and appreciate the importance of education, thus integrating both 
academics and athletics.261 
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With the possibility of increasing its national exposure, the NCAA 
would more than likely have an interest in performance-based 
scholarships.262 The NCAA could face the hurdles of determining when to 
implement the scholarships and providing a framework for the amount of 
revenue that needs to go toward funding the scholarships.263 Yet, because 
performance-based scholarships would increase competition among 
schools and conferences, the NCAA as a whole would benefit financially 
from elite performances from its student–athletes.264 Moreover, the NCAA 
would gain more opportunities for televised games, thus increasing its 
exposure to fans across the nation.265 
CONCLUSION 
The O’Bannon decision was a major event in collegiate athletics.266 As 
a result of this decision, student–athletes are finally able to reap the benefits 
of their labor on the playing field.267 In order to satisfy the holding in 
O’Bannon, the NCAA must allow Division I men’s basketball and FBS 
football student–athletes to receive compensation for the use of their 
names, images, and likenesses in live game broadcasts, video games, 
highlight clips, and other archival footage.268 However, in order to comply 
with Title IX, it is necessary for the NCAA also to provide an equal amount 
of funds to women student–athletes, which means doubling the amount of 
compensation.269 Although compensating both men and women may cause 
colleges and universities to offer less money to Division I men’s basketball 
and FBS football student–athletes, it is the only way for the NCAA to 
comply with both the Sherman Antitrust Act and Title IX.270 With regard to 
the possible tax implications, if the NCAA compensates student–athletes 
through performance-based scholarships for academic and athletic 
achievements, then it would prevent the income tax that students would 
face as employees.271 
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Performance-based scholarships are a simple solution to the Title IX 
problem because it provides not only an equal share of revenue to women’s 
college athletics, but to all sports programs—even the nonrevenue-
generating programs.272 These scholarships would maintain balance within 
student athletics, while fairly providing compensation for the use of 
student–athletes’ names, images, and likenesses in live game broadcast and 
highlight clips.273 Moreover, the idea to provide incoming student–athletes 
with consent forms to allow their schools and conferences to sell the rights 
of their names, images, and likenesses on their behalf maintains the 
amateurism that the NCAA is so adamant about preserving in college 
sports.274 Also, the performance-based scholarships solved the complex 
issue of paying student–athletes for the use of their names, images, and 
likenesses while maintaining their amateur status and avoiding income 
taxes.275 Overall, performance-based scholarships would conform to the 
O’Bannon decision because it would provide an opportunity to compensate 
Division I men’s basketball and FBS football student–athletes for licensing 
their names, images, and likenesses.276 
 
 272. See discussion supra Section III.A. (discussing the Title IX effects in college athletics). 
 273. See Dosh, supra note 154 (discussing revenue and nonrevenue sports in both men’s and 
women’s athletics). 
 274. See discussion supra Part I (providing the NCAA’s history of amateurism). 
 275. See discussion supra Section III.B. 
 276. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating 
that the NCAA may not restrict Division I men’s basketball and FBS football student–athlete 
compensation for the use of their names, images, and likenesses, but did not have to provide 
compensation). 
